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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 12:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Natal10 54
(decided March 27, 1990)
Defendant claimed that his constitutional right to be protected
against unreasonable search and seizure was violated under the
state 10 55 and federal1 056 constitutions because his personal items,
which were surrendered upon his arrest "and then lawfully held
by the jail for safe-keeping, . . . [were] transferred to the District
Attorney, without a warrant, for use as trial evidence." 1057
The defendant did not challenge the search conducted at the
time of his arrest. The court found that the defendant's right
against unreasonable search and seizure was not violated because
1054. 75 N.Y.2d 379, 553 N.E.2d 239, 553 N.Y.S.2d 650, cert denied,
Natal v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 169 (1990).
1055. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
1056. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1057. Natal, 75 N.Y.2d at 382, 553 N.E.2d at 240, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
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(1) the error committed was harmless in that eyewitness testi-
mony placed the defendant at the scene of the crime, and (2) al-
though the defendant had a property interest in his personal
items, he did not have "a privacy interest protectable by State
and Federal guarantees against unreasonable searches and
seizures.", 1058 Defendant was arrested for breaking into a house
and "taken to police headquarters, where he was forced to
surrender his clothing and personal effects. As a matter of police
routine, those items were inventoried... "1059 and placed in a
locker at the jail where defendant was being held. Nine months
later, which was one week before the trial, the district attorney
subpoenaed the items and introduced them into evidence as part
of the People's case. 1060
The court noted that items taken as evidence at the time of ar-
rest are distinguishable from "items later taken by prison au-
thorities [and] held as bailments to be safeguarded for the accused
during incarceration." 1061 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
while the defendant had a property interest in his personal effects,
he had not shown that he also had a privacy interest protectable
by the state and federal guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 10 62 "A constitutionally protected privacy
interest requires the existence of a subjective expectation of
privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.", 1063
Therefore, this expectation of privacy does not exist when
personal items are "exposed to police view under unobjectionable
circumstances"' 1064 and then lawfully transferred to the jail for
safekeeping.
To evaluate whether the defendant's expectation of privacy was
1058. Id. at 382-83, 553 N.E.2d at 240-41, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 651-52 (citing
People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552, 523 N.E.2d 290, 528 N.Y.S.2d 15
(1988); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977)) (as descriptive of
privacy issues regarding unreasonable searches and seizures).
'1059. Id. at 382, 553 N.E.2d at 240, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
1060. Id.
1061. Id. at 383, 553 N.E.2d at 240, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 651.
1062. Id. at 383, 553 N.E.2d at 241, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
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reasonable, the court applied the rationale established in People
v. Perel.1°65 In Perel, the defendant's property, which consisted
of slips of paper and an address book, was placed in a police
property envelope following his arrest. Shortly thereafter, a
police detective removed the property for examination because he
believed it contained evidence of the crime for which the
defendant was charged.1°66 Defendant was convicted. He
appealed, asserting that the slips of paper were obtained by an
illegal search. The court held that the search and seizure was
reasonable in light of the fact that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in property that the police had
lawfully seen as a result of the search and inventory of his person
at the police station.1067 The court reasoned that within a
justified larger seizure and detention of a person after an arrest,
"a less intrusive search" would not unduly violate any remaining
expectation of privacy. 1068
In Natal, the defendant argued that Perel was distinguishable
from his case because nine months had elapsed between the
initial seizure of his property and the "second look," while in
Perel, the time between "looks" was only thirty minutes. The
court rejected this distinction as having no "meaningful
difference." ' 1069 Perhaps because the court based its holding on
the fact that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy, the time difference between the two cases was not
viewed as meaningful. Therefore, it was not necessary for the
district attorney to secure a search warrant before obtaining
defendant's possessions from jail authorities.
In its discussion of this issue under the Federal Constitution,
the court of appeals summarized the federal law on the issue of
search and seizure of a defendant's property held in the property
room of a jail and later searched and taken for use at the defen-
dant's criminal trial as follows:
(i) when an object lawfully came into plain view at the time of
1065. 34 N.Y.2d 462, 315 N.E.2d 452, 358 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1974).
1066. Id. at 464-65, 315 N.E.2d at 454, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87.
1067. Id. at 468, 315 N.E.2d at 456-57, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 389-90.
1068. Id. at 467, 315 N.E.2d at 456, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
1069. Natal, 75 N.Y.2d at 384, 553 N.E.2d at 241, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
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a search upon the arrestee's arrival at the place of detention,
(ii) later investigation establishes that this item is of evidentiary
value, and
(iii)' the item remains in police custody as a part of the
arrestee's inventoried property, then it is permissible for the
police, without a warrant, to retrieve that object and thereafter
deal with it as an item of evidence. 107
0
The court stated that defendant's property fit within this criteria
even though it was maintained by a county jail instead of the po-
lice. 1071 Therefore, the court found that defendant's argument
must also be rejected under federal constitutional law.
The court stated further that the facts of this case did not re-
quire a decision on "whether, as a matter of State constitutional
law, we would subscribe to the perceived Federal law on the
subject. "1072
Seelig v. Koehler 10 73
(decided May 8, 1990)
Petitioners brought an article 78 proceeding to block the im-
plementation of a random urinalysis drug testing program, assert-
ing that the testing violated their right against unreasonable
searches and seizures as protected by the federal1074 and state10 75
constitutions. 1076 The court of appeals held that the random drug
urinalysis testing of correction officers was not violative of either
the federal or state constitution because petitioners had a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy that was outweighed by the state's
substantial interest in ensuring that correction officers are drug
1070. Id. at 383-84, 553 N.E.2d at 241, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 652 (quoting 2 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 5.3(b) at 491 (2d ed. 1987)); see also
United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1973).
1071. Natal, 75 N.Y.2d at 384, 553 N.E.2d at 241, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
1072. Id.
1073.76 N.Y.2d 87, 556 N.E.2d 125, 556 N.Y.S.2d 832, cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 134 (1990).
1074. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1075. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.
1076. Seelig, 76 N.Y.2d at 91, 556 N.E.2d at 126, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
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